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Abstract. We analyze the effects of a large place-based policy, subsidizing up to 50% of
investment costs of manufacturing firms in East Germany after reunification. We show that a 1-
percentage-point decrease in the subsidy rate leads to a 1% decrease in manufacturing employment.
We document important spillovers for untreated sectors in treated counties, untreated counties
connected via trade and local taxes, whereas we do not find spillovers on counties in the same local
labor market. We show that the policy is at least as efficient as cash transfers to the unemployed,
but is more effective in curbing regional inequality.
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1 Introduction
In many countries and federations, place-based policies are a means to support regions that are
economically lagging behind (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). The European Union spent more than
e350 billion – about a third of its budget – on regional policies during the funding period from 2014
to 2020 (Ehrlich and Overman, 2020). The U.S. currently devotes about $60 billion to place-based
policies (Bartik, 2020, Slattery and Zidar, 2020) – mostly through business tax incentives. A recent
wave of papers has demonstrated that place-based policies unfold positive economic effects on
targeted regions (see Kline and Moretti, 2014b, Neumark and Simpson, 2015, Duranton and Venables,
2018, for further summaries of the literature). However, it is well-known that the overall welfare
effects of place-based policies also depend on the indirect policy effects that go beyond direct effects
on treated workers and firms in subsidized regions (Austin et al., 2018). We refer to these indirect
effects as spillovers throughout the paper.
Spillovers may take various forms and signs. Positive agglomeration effects in subsidized places
might induce relocation effects and negative agglomeration in unsubsidized places (Kline and Moretti,
2014a). There might also be relocation of factors between treated and untreated sectors in subsidized
places, shaping local multiplier effects (Moretti, 2010). An increasing concentration of educated
workers may unfold positive human capital spillovers (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008, Diamond, 2016).
Local subsidies might be capitalized into housing prices leaving real wages unchanged (Busso et al.,
2013, Austin et al., 2018). Local subsidies might also have intra-regional spillovers via trade flows
(Blouri and Ehrlich, 2020). Local policymakers might respond to the (foregone) subsidies by adjusting
local policy instruments (Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018). Finally, a successful local subsidy should have
fiscal externalities on federal-level tax bases and social insurance systems (Austin et al., 2018). Most
of the literature has discussed the welfare effects of place-based policies using structural spatial
equilibrium models and putting a special emphasis on agglomeration spillovers (Kline, 2010, Kline
and Moretti, 2014a, Gaubert, 2018, Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020, Gaubert et al., 2021).
In this paper, we take a different perspective on spillover effects of place-based policies and
their welfare implications. We provide cleanly identified reduced-form estimates of the direct and
indirect effects of a prominent German place-based policy subsidizing investments of firms in
distressed East German regions post reunification. In particular, we investigate a host of potential
spillovers on other neighboring and far-away regions, untreated sectors, local housing markets and
local policy instruments. We then use the reduced-form evidence and calculate the efficiency costs
of the policy using the recently proposed measure of the marginal value of public funds (MVPF)
(Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020, Finkelstein and Hendren, 2020), which provides an intuitive, yet
comprehensive way to translate reduced-form behavioral effects into a welfare metric that accounts
for additional fiscal spillovers on other sources of government budget such as the personal income
tax or unemployment insurance. The MVPF framework benchmarks the welfare effects of a policy
by comparing to other policies, which can be taken from the literature, such as place-blind cash
transfers, or the same place-based policy ignoring spillovers. In a last step, we simulate the effects of
the place-based policy on regional inequality for given efficiency cost and compare the distributional
effects to related place-blind policies.
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We study the case of the most prominent German place-based policy called GRW.1 The GRW con-
stitutes Germany’s main regional policy scheme for underdeveloped regions (Deutscher Bundestag,
1997). While not exclusively targeted at East Germany, the overwhelming share of the subsidies
went to the formerly socialist part of the country after reunification and it was the main regional
subsidy to revitalize the East German economy after reunification. The GRW’s main instrument are
investment subsidies for manufacturing firms in eligible regions. These subsidies can be used for
purchasing new machines or building new production sites. The explicit goal of the policy – and a
criterion to qualify – is to boost investment, and thereby creating new jobs and stimulating regional
growth.
We combine official data on the universe of subsidy cases with administrative social security data
on firms and workers to estimate the reduce-form effects of the policy, differentiating between the
direct policy effects and various spillover effects across regions, sectors and to other local policies.
Our identifying variation comes from multiple reforms of the maximum subsidy rate of investment
cost between 1997 and 2014. These reforms changed subsidy rates differentially across East German
counties based on pre-determined economic performance. For each new policy regime, the measure
of economic development is based on past performance measures, which are determined at a higher
regional level. Hence, the measure is difficult to manipulate for counties and we provide evidence that
selection into treatment does not seem to be a concern. Explicitly, we compare counties that are below
the threshold yielding a higher subsidy rate to counties that are above. In other words, we zoom in
on counties that are relatively similar in terms of income, employment dynamics and infrastructure
amenities prior to treatment. Eligibility thresholds change across budgeting periods and these
changes are partly triggered by EU legislation, which is exogenous to economic developments in
East Germany.
We make use of the Establishment History Panel, an administrative plant-level data set, provided
by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. For the
years 1996-2017, we have access to a fifty percent random sample of plants in East Germany. The
data cover the annual number of employees at the plant level as well as the county in which it is
located. In addition, we rely on administrative data on individual wages included in the Sample
of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) – a representative two percent sample of German
employees subject to social security contributions from 1996 to 2014. Official subsidy data from 1996
to 2016 is provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. We have obtained the universe
of GRW subsidy cases, including the county, investment volume and amount in subsidies paid. In
addition, we gathered regional data to replicate the indicators determining treatment status across
all budgeting periods.
The main outcome of interest in our study is the effect of GRW subsidies on regional employment.
Econometrically, we make use of event study designs to pin down the policy effects. However, we do
not restrict our analysis to the overall effect of the policy on the treated regions, but also study the
underlying mechanisms and spillovers. Explicitly, we analyze (i) intra-county sectoral spillovers by
looking at non-treated industries in treated regions, (ii) cross-county regional spillovers by studying
the effect on untreated counties within the same local labor market, (iii) trade spillover by looking
1 The German name of the policy is Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur – throughout the
paper, we will refer to it using the official German acronym GRW.
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at counties with significant trade exposure to the treatment counties, and (iv) policy spillovers by
looking at the policy effect on local tax rates. We then use our reduced form estimates to infer the
welfare effects of the policy. More specifically, we make use of the novel framework proposed by
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) and Finkelstein and Hendren (2020) to calculate the marginal
value of public fund (MVPF) – that is the “bang for the buck” – of the policy. The MVPF explicitly
takes into account fiscal spillovers on other tax bases and social insurance programs (Austin et al.,
2018). Last, we simulate the policy’s capacity to affect regional inequality and compare it to other
place-blind transfers for given MVPF.
We derive the following three direct results for a one-percentage-point decrease of the subsidy
rate in the treated manufacturing sector. First, subsidized investment decreases by 14.6% and
total (i.e. subsidized plus unsubsidized) investment decreases by 6.7%. Second, in the long-run
manufacturing employment decreases by 1%. We do not find asymmetric effects of subsidy cuts and
increases. Third, wages are largely unaffected.
In terms of spillover effects, we derive the following results. First, a one percentage-point-decrease
of the subsidy rate for the manufacturing sector leads to a 0.26% and 0.47% employment reduction
in the untreated retail and construction sector, respectively. Second, there is no evidence for positive
or negative spillovers of a county-level shock within the local labor market. Third, we find evidence
for negative manufacturing employment responses of counties that have a higher trade exposure
to treated counties. Fourth, we demonstrate important negative policy spillovers: a decrease in
the subsidy leads to a long-run increase in local business and property tax rates, which can be
rationalized with a fixed expenditure requirements of municipalities and a decreasing tax base.
Last, in terms of welfare implications, we derive the following three results. First, we calculate
a marginal value of public funds of 0.96, which is higher than the estimates of the MVPF of
unemployment insurance and cash transfers, which target a similar set of beneficiaries (Hendren
and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Second, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the cost per
job were about 24,000e. Importantly, we show that both the cost per job and the marginal value of
public funds are substantially downward-biased if one does not account for spillovers. Third, given
the similarity in terms of the MVPF, we show in a simulation exercise that place-based policies are
more effective in reducing regional inequality for given efficiency costs compared to cash transfers
since place-based policies as more regionally targeted.
We contribute to the existing and recently growing literature on place-based policies in several
ways. First, we provide novel evidence on the direct, reduced-form effects of an important place-
based policy. Our findings reinforce recent findings that place-based policies work – in the sense that
they have a positive and long-lasting effect on the local economy. Kline and Moretti (2014a) show
that the Tennessee Valley Authority, the most prominent regional subsidy program in U.S. history
had a positive effect on manufacturing employment that lasted even beyond the program end due to
agglomeration forces. Looking at Chinese cities, Alder et al. (2016) show that special employment
zones have a strong positive effect on GDP mainly driven by an increase in capital accumulation. A
series of papers investigating the effects of the EU Structural Funds (ESF), a regional subsidy paid by
the European Union, show that the ESF increase GDP in the subsidized regions, but had no clear
effect on employment (Becker et al., 2010, 2012, 2013). Criscuolo et al. (2019) analyze an industrial
policy in the UK, which is similar to the GRW, and find employment effects that are quite comparable
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to our effects qualitatively and quantitatively. For Germany, Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) investigate a
different place-based subsidy paid to West German regions close the Iron Curtain from the 1970s to
until reunification and find positive treatment effects. In terms of the GRW, Brachert et al. (2019) find
no significant treatment effects, looking at West (instead of East) German regions, using different
data and a different identification strategy. Our findings of a positive (negative) employment effect
of a subsidy increase (decrease) is in line with descriptive, more policy-oriented papers in Germany
(Bade and Alm, 2010, Bade, 2012). Analyzing the direct effect of local subsidies is naturally related to
work looking at the effect of state and local taxes on workers and firms (see, e.g. Suárez Serrato and
Zidar, 2016, Fuest et al., 2018, Fajgenbaum et al., 2019, Slattery and Zidar, 2020). Our work is also
related to the large empirical literature studying the effects of place-blind industrial policies (focusing
on broader sectors) (see, e.g. Aghion et al., 2015, Liu, 2019, Lane, 2020, Manelicia and Pantea, 2021).
Second, we systematically investigate indirect spillover effects of place-based policies by providing
cleanly identified reduced-form estimates. While various empirical studies have looked at single
spill-overs, this is – to the best of our knowledge – the first comprehensive analysis looking at various
relevant spillovers discussed in the theoretical literature. In line with Criscuolo et al. (2019), we
find no evidence of positive or negative regional spillovers on neighboring counties. However, we
demonstrate important local demand effects as the untreated retail sector and construction sector
are negatively affected by decreases in regional subsidies to manufacturing firms. We also point
to trade spillover which have not been investigated in the literature before. In contrast to Moretti
(2010), our local multiplier effects are somewhat smaller, which might be explained by the fact that
subsidies are not targeted at high-tech, high-skill firms, but rather classic manufacturing firms. Last,
we find important policy spillovers that have not received much attention so far. We show that local
tax rates increase as a result of decreasing subsidies, which adds an additional burden on local firms.
This finding is in line with a result by Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) who look at a different German
place-based policy and show that the regional subsidy leads to higher local public investment levels.
Our results suggest that a decrease in the GRW erodes firm profits and thus the local tax base,
yielding higher local tax rates to finance the largely pre-committed local expenditures.
Third, we add to the current debate on the welfare effects of (place-based) policies. We make use
of the novel framework recently put forward by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) and Finkelstein
and Hendren (2020) that enables us to transform our reduced-from quasi-experimental estimates
into a welfare statement. We evaluate one of the first policies targeted at firms within this framework.
Our approach is an alternative to important structural approaches that have seen a recent surge in
the literature (Gaubert, 2018, Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2019, Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020, Gaubert
et al., 2021). Clearly and as established in other contexts, both approaches have their advantages
and disadvantages. While the structural approach allows to estimate policy counterfactuals and is
capable to capture general equilibrium effects of non-marginal policy changes, the MVPF framework
– similar to the sufficient statistics approach – allows for a more immediate mapping between clean
quasi-experimental evidence and its welfare implications (see Chetty, 2009, Kleven, 2021).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We explain the institutional setting in Section
2, followed by Section 3 on the research design. Section 4 presents the data. Our empirical results are
presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the welfare and inequality implications of the policy.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 The GRW Policy
In this paper, we study the main German regional economic policy, called “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” (GRW). The GRW is jointly coordinated and
financed by the federal government and the individual states. The explicit goal of the policy is to
equalize standards of living across German regions by stimulating local business activity. Equivalent
living standards across space is an important principle and policy goal in Germany, which is explicitly
mentioned in the constitution. The GRW is the main federal program to achieve this goal.
The policy was implemented in 1969 and subsidized West German underdeveloped regions
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In this study, we focus on the post-reunification effect of the GRW
until 2017. After reunification, the majority of GRW funds were directed to East German regions,
which were considerably less industrialized than their West German counterparts. As such, the GRW
was seen as one of the main instruments aiming at re-industrializing East Germany and bringing it
to Western levels.2
While the GRW consists of a bundle of different instruments, we focus on investment subsidies
paid out to plants – the central instrument accounting for 74% of the total GRW budget in our sample
period.3 These subsidies covered up to 50% of the costs of a specific investment project filed by a
plant. The subsidy rate varied across counties depending on the regional economic development,
making the GRW a place-based policies (see Section 2.2 for more details). From 1991 to 2016, on
average e1.8 billion of subsidies (in 2010 e) were paid out annually to East German firms.4
2.1 Eligibility
In order to receive the subsidy, plants need to file an application for approval with their respective
state government. In the application, they need to clearly define the investments project to be
subsidized. Typical projects comprise the acquisition of machinery, the construction or modernization
of buildings, but also licenses and patents. Labor costs can only be subsidized if employees can be
directly linked to the corresponding investment project.
Eligibility of a project is determined by three criteria. First, the project has to be relatively large.
Either annual investment costs have to exceed the average amount of the plant’s capital consumption
(economic depreciation) in the preceding three years by at least 50% (criterion 1a), or the project
has to increase the number of regular employees by at least 15% (criterion 1b). New plant opening
qualify under criterion 1b. Second, the project has to be limited in time. The maximum duration of
the project is three years (criterion 2). Third, the subsidies are intended for exporting firms. At least
half of the plants’ revenues have to be made outside of the county (criterion 3). The rationale behind
2 Other policy measures targeted at plants in Eastern Germany included a capital investment bonus program (Investi-
tionszulage), a non-discretionary capital subsidy targeted at entire Eastern Germany, and loans provided by KfW and the
European Recovery Program. Our empirical strategy outlined below makes sure that we isolate the effect of the GRW.
Another class of programs directed funds to municipalities rather than to plants. We check that the reforms exploited for
identification did not affect funds paid to municipalities.
3 The other important instrument are infrastructure subsidies to municipalities, which were granted independently of
the investment subsidies. Importantly, the maximum infrastructure subsidy rates do not exhibit variation across space.
4 These numbers include co-payments by the European Union via the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
Whether subsidies were paid for by the ERDF or GRW is irrelevant for the purpose of our analysis since in Germany, ERDF
funds simply increase states’ subsidy budgets. Restrictions on subsidy usage, such as sectoral restrictions and maximum
assistance rates are thus identical for ERDF and GRW funds.
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criterion 3 as revealed by the policy discussion in the 1960s is that export-oriented firms are supposed
to generate additional income within a county, which, in turn, is supposed to stimulate local demand.
Due to criterion 3, 74% of the GRW funds go to manufacturing firms. In Appendix Table B.6, we
shows an official list of sectors that automatically qualified for the subsidy according to Criterion 3
without the need to provide further evidence. Notice that certain industries were excluded from the
subsidies. These include the construction and retail sector which we will investigate for potential
spillover effects.
States have an annual budget for projects to be subsidized under the GRW program. In more
than 90% of cases, states did not exhaust their annual budgets, which suggests that there was usually
no rationing of the funds and no rivalry between projects. Nevertheless, not all projects were granted.
While official data on rejected projects is unfortunately not available, survey data for the state of
Thueringa from 2011 to 2016 suggests that roughly 39% of applications were denied (IWH, 2018).
However, these rejections were almost entirely due to formal reasons. The two main reasons for
rejection, accounting for 96% of rejections, were (i) missing documents and (ii) not meeting the
eligibility criteria. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the selection of projects was based on
their assessed quality.
2.2 Subsidy Rates
Upon successful application, plants receive subsidies to cover a certain share of the investment cost
stated in the application.5 There is a binding maximum subsidy rate imposed by federal law, which
varies by plant type, year and – importantly – plant location, the latter source of variation making
the GRW a place-based policy.
Below, we exploit the variation in maximum subsidy rates to estimate the causal effects of the
policy. In the following, we describe this variation in detail. As a general principle, the policy
accounted for differences in the economic performance within East Germany and assigned higher
subsidy rates to relatively less productive counties. Importantly, differentiation was conducted on
the national level by the Federal government based on past economic performance – both the national
decision and the past economic behavior being important features for our identification strategy.
More precisely, local productivity was measured by a performance indicator at the level of the
commuting zone (Arbeitsmarktregion) with counties being nested in commuting zones. There were 76
counties in East Germany and 53 commuting zones in the boundaries of 2014.6
In the following, we give an example of the performance indicator and how it affected subsidy
rates for the year 1997. The performance indicator for commuting zone r is the weighted geometric
mean of three sub-indicators and described by the following formula
indicator1997r = (in f r
1995
r )
0.1 × (wage1995r )
0.4 × (unemp1995r )
0.5,
where in f r measures the quality of a county’s infrastructure in 1995, wage represents per-capita
5 It takes on average about 8 months for an application to be approved (IWH, 2018).
6 Over the years, some counties in East German merged. In a robustness check, we make sure that mergers do not
affect our results by excluding all counties that were partially treated. We exclude the county of Berlin from all of our
analyses because of its status as a federal state.
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Table 1: Subsidy regimes for East German counties since 1990
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5 Regime 6 Regime 7
1990-1996 1997-1999 2000-2006 2007-2010 2011-2013 2014-2017 2018-
priority high low high low high low high low high low high medium low high low
small plants 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 50% n/a 50% 40% 40% 35% 30% 40% 30%
medium plants 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 40% n/a 40% 30% 30% 25% 20% 30% 20%
large plants 35% n/a 35% 28% 35% 28% 30% n/a 30% 20% 20% 15% 10% 20% 10%
# counties 76 n/a 49 27 41 35 76 n/a 58 18 9 64 3 9 67
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1996), Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007), Deutscher Bundestag (2016) Notes: Plant size
is defined by the number of employees. Small plants have less than 51 employees, medium-sized plants 51 to 250, and large ones above 250.
earnings in 1995 and unemp measures the unemployment rate in 1995.7 All counties were ranked
according to this indicator as depicted in Appendix Figure A.1. Counties with an index-value below
100 were classified as high funding priority, counties with a value above the threshold as low funding
priority. Counties with a high funding priority receive a higher subsidy rate.8
Importantly, indicators, cut-off values and subsidy rates are valid for specific regimes that last
between 3 and 7 years. At the end of a regime, indicator function, priority statuses and subsidy rates
change, which leads to substantial variation in maximum subsidy rates from the perspective of the
individual county. In the last part of the subsection, we document the evolution of regimes and the
resulting policy variation.
Table 1 gives an overview of the policy variation. In the early 1990s, all East German counties
were treated equally, with the maximum subsidy rate for small and medium-sized plants being 50%
and 35% for large plants. As of 1997, policy makers started to differentiate funding priorities spatially.
Based on the performance indicator described above, 27 out of 76 counties were assigned to low
funding priority and consequently experienced a cut in the maximum subsidy rates by 7 percentage
points across all three plant size groups (see Table 1, regimes 1 vs. 2). In 2000, a new ranking of
the counties was generated based on updated measures of past economic performances and slight
changes in the indicator function (see Appendix B.2). As a consequence, additional counties switched
from high to low priority status.
In 2007, the ranking of counties was renewed. This time, all German counties (East and West)
were jointly assessed and ranked – in contrast to previous years, where East Germany regions were
assessed separately. As West German regions were still richer than their East German counterparts,
all East German counties received high priority status. As a consequence, 35 counties saw an
increase in their (employment-weighted) subsidy rate.9 This particular reform is interesting for
7 The infrastructure sub-indicator is based on measures of accessibility of airports and larger cities by car or train, of the
travelling time for trucks to the next trans-shipment center, the share of employees in applied research institutes, the share
of apprenticeship training position, the share of employees in technical occupations, the share of high school graduates,
capacity of inter-company training centers and population density.
8 The rule is almost perfectly deterministic such that all counties above the threshold receive lower funding probability.
However, there is some noise in the assignment as revealed by Appendix Table B.3. We see that few counties below the
cut-off were assigned low priority. This is mainly due to county mergers that occurred after the reform, i.e. a county above
the threshold was merged with a county that was below the threshold. As mentioned above, we exclude partially treated
counties in a robustness check. In addition, the Federal government (jointly with state governments) reserves the right to
deviate from the ranking in rare exceptions (two counties in 1997). This is mostly due one county biasing the commuting
zone average upwards. For example, the relatively poorer county of Gifhorn is located in the same commuting zone as the
county of Wolfsburg, which contains the head quarters of Volkswagen. Therefore, policy makers decided to assign Gifhorn
to a higher priority even though the commuting zone index was too high (Brachert et al., 2019).
9 The subsidy rate for small and large plants, which account for two thirds of manufacturing employment on average,
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Figure 1: Map of reforms from 1996 to 2014
(a) number of reforms
2
3
4
(b) difference in subsidy rate between 2014 & 1996
-13.4
-24.9
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1996), Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007), Deutscher
Bundestag (2016) Notes: Berlin is excluded from the analysis.
various reasons. First, the re-ranking was completely exogenous to the economic performance of
East German counties. Second, the reform enables us to test whether effects are symmetric.
The next reassessment occurred in 2011, when 18 counties were downgraded in their priority
status. The reason for this change was the EU’s enlargement from 15 to 25 member states resulting
in a decline of the average regional GDP per capita in the EU. According to EU regulations, regions
above the 75th percentile of GDP per capita lose eligibility for the highest maximum rates. In 2014,
Germany was required by the EU to again lower their maximum subsidy rates in two steps. Until
2017, subsidy rates were lowered a maximum of 35% for small plants (25% and 15% for medium and
large plants) and in 2018, there was another cut of 5 percentage points.10 An exception was made for
counties that were located directly at the border with Poland since the difference in the subsidy rate
between them and the Polish regions would be higher than EU regulations allow. Therefore, these 9
counties were allowed higher subsidy rates throughout the whole period. Note that, even though we
do not exploit the 2018 reform directly since our data ends in 2017, we still account for these future
reforms in our event study setup.
Overall, the various reforms generate substantial variation in maximum subsidy rates across
rose by 7 and 2 percentage points, respectively, while the rate for medium plants decreased by 3 percentage points.
10 Three well-performing counties were directly downgraded to the 2018 level.
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East German counties, which we exploit in our empirical research design presented in Section 3.
Figure 1a illustrates that all counties experience at least two changes in the subsidy rate, while more
than 50% experience three or four changes. The change in the (employment-weighted) maximum
subsidy rate varies from a reduction of 13.4 to 24.9 percentage points (see Figure 1b). The right panel
also shows some interesting regional clustering, e.g. the counties bordering Poland experienced the
smallest cuts in rates, while the area around Leipzig, saw the largest. Note that our identification
strategy only exploits changes within federal states – indicated by the thicker line – for identification.
3 Research Design
We estimate the causal effect of the subsidy implementing different variants of event study designs.
Given that the policy variation described in Section 2 is quite complex, we develop our preferred
empirical model step-by-step.
3.1 Empirical Model
As described in Section 2, the vast majority of subsidy rate changes were decreases. In the simplest
form the event study model regresses an outcome y (such as employment or investment) of plant i in
county c and year t, yi,t on dummy variables indicating a subsidy cut in county c at time t as follows.
ln yi,t =
10
∑
k=−4
βkDkc,t + ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + ε i,t. (1)
where Dkc,t is the mentioned set of event indicators indicating whether a change in the maximum
subsidy rate occurred for the county k ∈ [−4, ..., 10] periods ago. We refer to Dkc,t as binned event
indicators as the indicators at the endpoints of the effect windows, k = −4 and k = 10, take
into account all observable past (future) events going beyond the effect window (McCrary, 2007,
Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2020). Let dc,t−k = 1 if county c experienced a subsidy cut in year t− k,
dc,t−k = −1 in case of a subsidy increase and dc,t−k = 0 otherwise, then the binned event indicators
Dkc,t are formally defined as
Dkc,t =

∑−4s=−∞ dc,t−s if k = −4
dc,t−j if − 4 < k < 10
∑∞s=10 dc,t−s if k = 10.
(2)
The event study design enables us to test for flat pre-trends (k ≤ −1) and informs about the
adjustment paths of the post-treatment effect (k ≥ 0). All other estimates are to be interpreted relative
to the pre-treatment period k = −1, whose coefficient is normalized to zero. In some specifications,
we additionally include time-varying control variables at the county-level Xc,t. Our specifications
always include plant and county fixed effects γc and δi as well as state-by-year fixed effects ψs,t to
absorb state-specific shocks. This is important because state governments play a role in granting the
subsidy and we see regional clustering of the intensity of subsidy rate cuts (see Section 2). Standard
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errors are clustered at both the county and plant level throughout.
Table 1 showed that there is variation in the subsidy rate cuts over time and across counties and
plant types as the reforms differentially affected maximum subsidy rates for different plant sizes. To
exploit this variation, we define treatment intensity Ikc,t of county c, year t and lead/lag k ∈ [−4, 10]
as
Ikc,t = ∆s
small
c,t−kω
small
c + ∆s
med
c,t−kω
med
c + ∆s
large
c,t−kω
large
c . (3)
The intensity measure is a weighted average of the (absolute) change in maximum subsidy rate
∆spc,t−k = |s
p
c,t−k − s
p
c,t−k−1| across plant types, p ∈ [small, med, large]. Respective weights are denoted
by ωpc and defined as the manufacturing employment share of plants of size p in county c
ω
p
c =
Epc,1995
Esmallc,1995 + E
med
c,1995 + E
large
c,1995
∀ f ∈ [small, med, large].
E fc,t denotes the number of workers in manufacturing plants of size f in county c at time t. Weights
ω
p
c are time-invariant and calculated in the data year 1995, hence prior to the first reform.11
Based on these definitions, the generalized event study design that accounts for the different
treatment intensities is given by:
ln yi,t =
10
∑
k=−4
βk
[
Dkc,t · Ikc,t
]
+ ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψst + ε i,t (4)
Compared to the basic model given in equation (1), this variant of the event study replaces the
dummy treatment indicator with an indicator that is specific to the event. As shown in Schmidheiny
and Siegloch (2020), event studies – just as the numerically equivalent distributed lag models – can
be easily generalized to account for multiple changes of different intensities if treatment effects are
homogeneous over time.
3.2 Identification and Sensitivity
The classical identification check in event study designs is to assess whether pre-treatment effects are
statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, even flat pre-trends might not be sufficient to interpret
the estimates causally. The key remaining threat to identification is omitted variable biases concurrent
with treatment timing. While plant and county fixed effects control for time invariant confounders at
the respective levels, state-by-year fixed effects flexibly account for any confounding shock occurring
at the state-level. However, if the concurrent and confounding shock is at the county-level, estimates
would still be biased.
The prime suspect in our context is local economic performance as subsidy rates are a function of
past regional economic performance (see Section 2.2). The better the county performed economically
in the past, the higher the probability of a subsidy rate cut. Note that such differences in past
economic development should, however, show up in the pre-treatment effects and we would expect
pre-treatment effects increasing from below zero. If we expect that a cut in the subsidy rate hurts the
11 We drop year 1995 from the data after calculating the shares.
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local economy, this relationship would bias our estimates towards zero.
Improving comparability. Given our institutional setup, we can further improve the comparability
of treatment and control group. Using the cut-off between high- and low-priority counties and the
resulting discontinuity in subsidy rates, we can restrict the sample to counties close to the cut-off.
Denote TM,R (CM,R) the set of the M counties closest to the performance cut-off from below (above)
following the indicator for regime R. Let SM,R = TM,R ∪ CM,R be the set of 2M counties around
the cut-off during regime R. As we look at multiple regimes and counties might move toward and
away from the regime-specific thresholds, we define the set SM that includes all counties that are at
least once within the set of counties close to the threshold: SM =
⋂
R S
M,R. We can then refine our
empirical model in equation (4) by restricting the underlying estimation sample to counties in SM:
ln yi,t | SM =
10
∑
k=−4
βk
[
Dkc,t · Ikc,t
]
+ ξXc,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + ε i,t. (5)
In our preferred baseline model, we choose M = 30. We also vary M by reducing it or increasing
to capture the full sample and find that results (pre and post-treatment effects) do not change in a
meaningful way lending credibility to our identification strategy.
Heterogeneous treatment effects. With homogeneous treatment effects, applying an event study
with multiple treatments of different intensities produces unbiased estimates of the treatment effect
(Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2020). However, there has been a recent important literature emphasizing
that (static and dynamic) difference-in-difference designs with differential treatment timing estimated
with a two-way fixed effect model can be severely biased in the presence of heterogeneous treatment
effects (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2020a,b, Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2020, Sun and
Abraham, 2020, Borusyak et al., 2021). Several new estimators have been proposed to get unbiased
estimates when treatment effects are not homogeneous. However, all these estimators are not valid
for environments with multiple events for the same unit. In order to test for potential biases due to
heterogeneous treatment effects, we cut our sample in 2006 and focus on the first three regimes since
the reform in 2007 treats all counties (see Table 1). This yields a sample where every unit is treated
at-most once and we retain a group of never-treated units. We apply the estimators developed in
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) and Sun and Abraham (2020) to our basic dummy
variable specification described in equation (1).12 Notice that the two estimators use different control
groups since Sun and Abraham (2020) only allow comparisons to never-treated units, whereas
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) are also using not-yet treated units as controls. We find
that our estimates are unlikely to be driven by heterogeneous treatment effects.
Controlling for observables. As another test, we include county-level controls that control for local
business cycle effects. We control for log GDP per capita and the unemployment rate lagged by one
year. This specification tries to account for remaining differences in past economic performance and
thereby purifies our βk estimates from potential bias. Estimates are hardly affected and as expected,
12 Note that in our setup without covariates and with never-treated units, the estimators from Sun and Abraham (2020)
and Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) coincide.
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if anything, slightly more negative. In another check, we include the contemporaneous values of the
business cycle covariates – ignoring even more the obvious bad control problem. Effects are again
very similar. Last, we also use the business cycle variables as outcomes and test whether we find
significant pre-treatment effects pointing to an identification concern. We find flat pre-trends.
Other subsidies. As discussed in Section 2, we test whether changes in the GRW subsidy rate have
triggered changes in other regional subsidy programs, which could in turn bias our estimates. We
test for this possibility by looking at the effect of GRW subsidy cuts on the sum of other subsidies
received and find no spillovers.
Symmetry. We estimate a model that explicitly differentiates between subsidy cuts and increases to
test for symmetry. Note that we are mostly observing subsidy cuts, but the peculiar reform of 2007
enables us to separately study subsidy increases.
Sensitivity. Apart from these identification tests, we run several sensitivity checks to make sure
that modelling choices are not driving our results. First, we implement the basic dummy variable
event study specification of equation (1) which ignores the size of the subsidy changes. Second, we
drop the few counties that – for various reasons discussed in Section 2 – were only partially treated.
Fourth, we vary the event window between nine, ten and eleven lags. Last, we estimate our model in
first differences instead of with fixed effects. In none of these checks, results change in a meaningful
way.
3.3 Extensions to Test for Spillovers
One contribution of our paper is to systematically look at spillovers. Depending on the context, we
have to adjust our baseline model, given in equation (5) to assess the role of the spillover.
Testing for regional spillovers. A cut in subsidies might have spillover effects that go beyond
county borders and affect neighboring counties. Theoretically, these spillovers can be positive in
case local demand or agglomeration effects radiate beyond county lines. They may also be negative
if economic activities are relocated from control to treatment counties. We test for those kinds of
spillovers by moving the analysis to a higher level of aggregation. Explicitly, we follow Criscuolo
et al. (2019) and aggregate equation (5) to the level of the local labor market. The difference between
the estimate at the county level and the estimate at the local labor market level gives an indication of
regional spillovers. Note that there is some variation in subsidy rates across counties within local
labor markets. First, counties have different plant size distributions. Second, there were county-level
mergers beyond commuting local labor market borders. Third, there were some exceptions in the
assignment rules discussed in Section 2, for instance, the special treatment of counties bordering
Poland in the late 2010s or due to extreme outlier counties in terms of economic performance within
local labor markets.
Testing for trade spillovers. Given that manufacturing firms in East German counties are part of
a larger value chain, we also test for trade spillover. In particular, we test whether manufacturing
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plants in other counties that have significant trade exposure to the treatment counties also respond
to the subsidy cuts. First, we take the imports (measured in tons per year) of county c coming from
treatment county g with c 6= g and divide them by the total imports of county c. Equivalently, we
calculate the share of exports that are exported from county c to treatment county g. Then, let the
trade exposure of county c in year t to a reform that happened l years ago be defined as:
trade exposurelc,t = ∑
g 6=c
importscg
total importsc
[
Dlg,t · I lg,t
]
+ ∑
g 6=c
exportscg
total exportsc
[
Dlg,t · I lg,t
]
(6)
where Dlg,t and I
l
g,t are defined as above. To test for trade spillovers, we include the trade exposure
measure in our model.
ln yi,t =
10
∑
k=−4
βk
[
Dkc,t · Ikc,t
]
+
10
∑
l=−4
βltradetrade exposure
l
c,t + δi + γc + ψs,t + ε i,t (7)
where βltrade represents the effect on plants with trade exposure to a one-percentage-point subsidy
cut l years ago.
4 Data
In this section, we present the data that we use in our analysis. Detailed information on variable
definitions and sources can be found in Appendix Table B.1 and summary statistics are presented in
Appendix Table B.2.
4.1 Subsidy Data
We make use of administrative subsidy data provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
For the years 1996-2016, we obtained the universe of GRW subsidy cases in East Germany including
investment volume, subsidy amount and the receiving plant’s county. Matching these data to plants
is prohibited due to data protection laws, hence we are unable to identify which plants did in fact
receive subsidies and which did not. We follow standard practice and estimate the intent-to-treat
effect, investigating the employment response of plants in a treated area (Criscuolo et al., 2019). As
mentioned above, 74% of all subsidies were paid to manufacturing firms. Appendix Table B.2 shows
that the average yearly subsidy payments received by a county amount to e18 million, supporting
investment projects worth e82 million.
4.2 Employment and Wage Data
We measure employment using the Establishment History Panel (BHP), which is based on social
security records and provided by the Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg (Schmucker
et al., 2018). We have access to a fifty percent random sample of plants in Germany for the period of
1996-2017. The dataset includes the annual number of employees by skill at a plant as well as the
county in which it is located and its industry classification.
To measure wages, we additionally make use of the IAB’s Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies (SIAB) from 1996 to 2014. The dataset is a 2% sample of individual earnings biographies
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and includes individual characteristics as well as employer information from the BHP.13 We drop all
apprentices, social service workers, working students and interns and convert wages to 2010 e. Then,
we calculate the median wage at the county level for manufacturing workers, non-manufacturing
workers and all workers. As one can see in Appendix Table B.2, workers in the manufacturing sector
have a higher median wage than workers in other sectors. We also calculate wages by education level
within the manufacturing sector. As expected, high-skill workers earn substantially higher wages
than their low-skilled peers.
4.3 Investment Data
Moreover, we obtain investment data at the plant level from the AFiD Establishment-Panel provided
by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. The data cover the universe of German manufacturing
and mining plants with 20 or more employees for the period from 1996 to 2016. Importantly, we can
observe total investment on the plant level which we deflate to 2010 e. Additionally, the AFiD data
provide industry codes and information on the plant location at the municipal level. We use that
information to restrict our sample to manufacturing plants and locate plants within in the current
county borders.
4.4 Trade Flow Data
We use trade flow data from the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure to calculate
the trade exposure of German counties as described in Section 3.3. The data include a complete
matrix of trade flows between all German counties as well as foreign countries for the year 2010.
Trade flows are measured in tons per year and we can observe the direction of trade, i.e. we can
differentiate between imports and exports between two counties.
4.5 Other Regional Variables
Last, we make use of further regional variables either as outcomes or as control variables. We obtain
administrative data on the local business cycle (GDP per capita and local unemployment) as well as
labor force and population numbers, provided by the statistical offices of the German states. In order
to assess policy spillovers, we additionally obtain data on the municipal local business and property
tax rate. While the tax base of these taxes is set at the national level, municipalities can freely set
their own tax rates (see Fuest et al., 2018, Löffler and Siegloch, 2021, for a detailed description).
Furthermore, we obtain tax revenues from business and property taxation and use it to calculate the
respective tax base.
In addition, we gather data on municipality-level grants and subsidies in order to make sure that
other transfers are not confounding our GRW effect. To keep the level of analysis consistent, we
aggregate the municipal-level data to the county level using pre-form population shares as weights
if necessary. Moreover, we collect data on the net commuting flows normalized by the number of
employees from the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning.
13 Earnings histories are in general recorded for persons who have appeared at least once in the social security system,
either as an employee or as being unemployed, since 1975.
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Last, we add on housing prices, to assess whether the GRW subsidies are capitalized into housing
prices. In order to populate our long panel starting in the 1990s, we use house price data from the
German real estate association IVD. These data cover the largest city within a county.14
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the reduced form effects of the place-based policy. Subsection 5.1 focuses
on direct policy effect of a subsidy cut for manufacturing plants in treated counties. In subsection
5.2, we address various identification challenges and demonstrate that our main effects are robust.
Subsection 5.3 sheds light on the various spillover effects of the GRW.
5.1 Direct Policy Effects
Investment effects. In a first step, we assess whether cuts of the maximum subsidy rates affect the
subsidies paid out, that is, we test our first stage. Figure 2 shows the effect of a one-percentage-point
decrease in the maximum subsidy rate on GRW subsidies at the county level. We find that a subsidy
rate cut in treated counties decreases subsidy amounts by 13.8% after ten years which corresponds
to a decrease of e2.5 million for the average county. In line with this finding, we also see that log
subsidized investment decreases in a very similar manner. The total investment volume subsidized
by the GRW decreases by 14.6% ten years after the reform. Reassuringly, treatment and control
groups exhibit a very similar development before a reform for both variables as revealed by the
pre-treatment trends.
Last and importantly, we are interested in the effects of subsidy rate cuts on total investments
by plants. Using the AFiD data, we show that overall investment decreases by roughly 6.7% after
ten years. The investment response is almost exclusively driven by investment in equipment, which
makes up about 85% of all investment (see Appendix Figure C.1). Note that it is difficult to make a
statement about possible crowding-out of private investment because of two reasons. First, the AFiD
data only contain plants with 20 or more employees.15 Second, there might be positive or negative
spillovers on untreated manufacturing firms, which are reflected in the AFiD estimates, but not in
the effect on subsidized investments. Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle these effects without
strong assumptions.
Employment effects. We now move to our main outcome, the employment effect of the GRW
policy. Consistent with the finding of a decrease in investments, Figure 3 shows that cuts in the
subsidy rate significantly reduce plant-level manufacturing employment. While pre-trends are flat,
our estimates imply that a one-percentage-point decrease in the maximum subsidy rate leads to
a decrease in manufacturing employment of 1% after ten years for our baseline sample.16 These
14 For some county-year pairs, no data is available. We interpolate occasionally missing data points linearly. More
comprehensive micro data, e.g. from the online platform ImmobilienScout24 (the German Zillow), only start much later in
the mid-2000s.
15 The AFiD is the largest and only administrative microdata set on plant-level investment in Germany.
16 For each regime, we pick the 30 counties which are closest to the cut-off from below and the 30 counties that are
closest from above. Aggregating over regimes, we end up with 55 counties that are at least once close to the cut-off. In
some years, less than 30 counties are above the threshold, which is why the number of counties is below 60.
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Figure 2: Event study estimates: subsides and investment
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log GRW subsidies log subsidized investment
log investment
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, AFiD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of changes in log subsidies paid to counties, log subsidized investment and log investment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum
assistance rate as in equation (5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the
county and plant level. See Tables C.1 and C.2 for the point estimates.
estimates are quantitatively similar to the main finding of Criscuolo et al. (2019). We find that the
decrease in employment is mostly driven by medium-skilled workers, which make up 80% of all
manufacturing workers, whereas employment of low- and high-skill workers decreases to a lesser
extent (see Appendix Figure A.2). Thus, these results do not speak in favor of human capital spillover
playing a major role in the context of the GRW subsidy, which targets mainly German manufacturing
firms (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008, Diamond, 2016).
Since the negative effect on manufacturing employment at the plant-level only reflects adjustments
at the intensive margin, we also look at the number of manufacturing establishments on the county
level. Appendix Figure A.3 shows that there is little evidence for any effects on the extensive margin.
Accordingly, the negative effect on total manufacturing employment at the county level in Figure A.3
is quantitatively very similar to the plant-level effect in Figure 3.
As discussed in Section 2, the rationale of the GRW policy was to stimulate the export-oriented
manufacturing sector and thereby push the entire local economy. Figure 3 shows that the manufac-
turing sector, which accounts for 18% of total employment, is responding as intended. In terms of
total employment, however, we find little evidence that the aggregate effects on non-manufacturing
plants are particularly strong. As a result, total employment goes down by only 0.2% (Appendix
Figure A.4). Nevertheless, the aggregate effect on non-manufacturing employment masks interesting
spillovers on certain industries, which we discuss in Section 5.3 below.
In line with the effect on employment, we detect that the number of unemployed increases by
about 0.5%, however estimates are imprecise (see Appendix Figure A.5). This suggests that the
laid-off workers mostly transitioned to unemployment. Consistent with that, there is no effect on the
size of the labor force (see Appendix Figure A.5). GDP per capita at the county-level also drops, but
the effect is not significant (see Appendix Figure A.6).
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Figure 3: Event study estimates: plant-level manufacturing employment
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs
(M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.3 for the point estimates.
Wage effects. Last, the decrease in labor demand could lead to decreasing wages in the manufac-
turing sector. Using the SIAB data, we calculate the median wage of workers in the manufacturing
sector at the county level. We use the median as around 13% of wages are top-coded in the SIAB
data.
As Figure 4 shows, wages are virtually unaffected by subsidy cuts. Also, when differentiating
by skill, wages for all skill groups are largely unaffected (see Appendix Figure C.2). Wages in
non-treated sectors and overall wages do not respond significantly to the subsidy cut either (see
Appendix Figure C.3a). Results are similar when using average wages instead of median wages (see
Appendix Figure C.3b).
5.2 Identification and Sensitivity Checks
In the following, we present various tests demonstrating the robustness of our main results. The
rationale behind the different checks is discussed in Section 3.2.
Improving comparability. First, our baseline specification improves the comparability of treatment
and control group counties by focusing on the jurisdictions that are close to the eligibility cut-off
that determines treatment status. Our preferred specification uses 55 counties around the cut-off per
regime. This is clearly an arbitrary choice trading off comparability and statistical power. Appendix
Figure C.4a presents results for different cut-off samples including the full sample. The magnitude
of the employment effect is hardly affected as we vary the number of counties around the cutoff.
Controlling for observables. Next, we add control variables that pick up local business cycle
fluctuations (and consequently affected treatment status via the eligibility indicator). Reassuringly,
the inclusion has little effects on the results, as demonstrated in Appendix Figure C.4b. Importantly,
we do not find significant pre-trends when using log GDP per capita or unemployment as an outcome
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Figure 4: Event study estimates: median manufacturing wages
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log median
manufacturing wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55
counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Table C.9 for the point estimates.
(see Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6).
Other subsidies. We also test the effect of the GRW reforms on other subsidies received by
municipalities. Figure C.5 shows that the reforms did not have a significant effect on other subsidies
received by municipalities.
Symmetry. The majority of subsidy rate changes are decreases. However, the reform in 2007 in
which all East German counties were assigned high priority status (see Section 2.2), led to an increase
in subsidy rates for roughly half of the East German counties. Therefore, we can estimate a model
that allows for different effects of subsidy increases and decreases. Appendix Figure A.7 shows a
symmetric pattern. We can neither reject the null hypothesis that any individual post-treatment effect
is asymmetric nor the joint test of asymmetry (p-value = 0.213).
Heterogeneous treatment effects. To test whether heterogeneous treatment effects are biasing
our results, we apply the estimators by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) and Sun and
Abraham (2020) to our baseline dummy variable model described in equation (1). We stop our
sample in the year 2006 to have a set-up with a maximum of one treatment per county and retain
a group of never-treated units. To ensure a comparability across specifications, we also estimate
equation (1) as a standard event study on the same sample. We plot the resulting estimates and their
standard errors in Appendix Figure A.8. The effects are very close both in size and pattern to our
baseline event study estimates. We conclude that heterogeneous treatment effects are unlikely to
drive our results.
Sensitivity with regard to modelling choices. Last, we provide a set of checks that assess the
sensitivity of our findings with regard to modelling choices we make when setting up our baseline.
First, we test whether implementing a standard event study design using a discrete treatment
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indicator following equation (1) yields similar results. As Appendix Figure C.6a shows, results are
very similar when comparing our baseline model and the dummy-variable specification scaled by
the average cut.
Second, recall that due to changes in county border definitions, in some counties only a subset
of municipalities receives a decrease in the maximum rate, effectively reducing treatment intensity.
Dropping these few partially treated counties yields larger effects, suggesting that our baseline
estimate is conservative (see Appendix Figure C.6b).
Third, we vary the number of lags of our event window between nine and eleven years. As
Appendix Figure C.7a shows, the effects tend to level off after ten years. Last, Appendix Figure
C.7b shows our baseline results estimated both in a fixed effect and first difference model. Size and
pattern are again very similar.
5.3 Spillover Effects
While we have established a clean and robust direct policy effect, we investigate various potential
spillover effects in the following subsection.
Intra-county spillovers. First, we check whether the place-based policy had an effect on untreated
industries in treated counties. Above, we have shown that non-manufacturing employment only
responds marginally to the cut in subsidy rates, resulting in a small and imprecise aggregate
employment effect. Decomposing non-manufacturing employment into finer industries, however,
we do find some evidence of intra-county sectoral spillovers. More specifically, we look at the retail
and construction sector which were de jure excluded from receiving GRW subsidies allowing us to
pinpoint spillover effects (see Appendix Table B.6). Figure 5a shows (positive) spillover effects for the
untreated retail and construction sector.17 A cut in subsidy rates leads to an immediate decreases
in employment in the construction sector, which seems intuitive as we have seen that subsidy cuts
trigger an immediate decrease in investment projects like building new or extending production
facilities. Likewise, we detect a (smaller) negative effect on retail employment, which could be
explained by a decrease in local demand. In total, one job lost in the manufacturing sector leads
to 0.64 [0.16,1.87] additional jobs lost in retail and construction sectors. This is a somewhat lower
estimate of local spillover than Moretti (2010) finds for US cities. A likely reason for this divergence
is that the GRW subsidy is paid to traditional manufacturing firms rather than firms that rely heavily
on highly-skilled workers.
We also test whether subsidy rate changes are capitalized in house prices. If an increase in the
subsidy rate would lead to increased house prices, the distributional impact of the policy would
change with (pre-existing) home owners being main beneficiaries. As Appendix Figure A.9 shows,
we do not find any effect on house prices.
Regional spillovers. Next, we test whether negative manufacturing employment effects in treated
counties spread across county borders within the local labor market. We aggregate county-level
manufacturing employment to the local labor market level and use the weighted average of counties’
treatment intensities to re-estimate equation (4) on the baseline sample. Figure 5b shows that the
17 We define a positive spillover as going into the same direction as the direct policy effect.
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Figure 5: Event study estimates: spillover effects
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Source: BHP, Statistical Offices of German States Notes: Panel (a) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression
of log industry employment at the plant level on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (5). The
sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.22
for the point estimates. Panel (b) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county and local labor market level. When aggregating
to the local labor market level, treatment intensities of counties are weighted by the number of manufacturing employees. The sample
includes the counties or local labor markets that contain the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M = 30). Clustering of standard errors is at the
county or local labor market level. See Table C.24 for the point estimates. Panel (c) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals
of a regression of changes in the log local business and property tax rates on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate
at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
See Tables C.26 and C.27 for the point estimates. Panel (d) plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression as in
equation (7) using log manufacturing employment at the plant level as the outcome. The sample includes all German counties. Clustering
of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.28 for the point estimates.
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treatment effect on manufacturing employment at the labor market level is very similar to our
baseline at the plant and county level implying that there was little reallocation of workers across
counties within local labor markets. This is consistent with the null effects on the net commuting
flow per employee and population we find (see Appendix Figure A.10).
Policy spillovers. We also test for the possibility of policy spillovers. Since a subsidy cut negatively
impacts local employment, municipalities finances are also affected. The effect is theoretically
ambiguous. If local politicians want (or are forced) to balance their budget, they might need to
increase local tax rates to counteract the loss of tax revenue. On the other hand, local politicians being
aware of tax competition might try to compensate firms for the decrease in subsidies by lowering tax
rates. Figure 5c shows that both local business and property tax rates are raised in response to a cut
in the maximum subsidy rate. This finding is not surprising in the context of German municipalities,
which are not very flexible in adjusting their expenditures (Löffler and Siegloch, 2021).
Overall, the results on policy spillovers imply that businesses in treatment counties do not only
receive a subsidy cut, but also face higher business and property tax rates. Local tax revenues from
property taxation increase slightly, whereas business tax revenues decrease (see Appendix Figure
C.8a). The latter effect implies a shrinking business tax base. As we do not see any effects on the
number of plants, the most plausible answer is that firm profits decrease (see Appendix Figure C.8b).
Trade spillovers. Last, we assess whether cuts in the GRW affected untreated counties that were
connected to treated counties via trade flows using the empirical model specified in equation (7).
We differentiate between import and export exposure to treatment counties. Figure 5d shows that
a 1% trade exposure to a 1 percentage-point-decrease in the subsidy rate reduces manufacturing
employment by 0.005%. This is consistent with the effect of the subsidies propagating through the
value chain and thereby also affecting untreated counties with higher levels of trade exposure to
treated counties.
6 Discussion: Efficiency and Inequality Effects
In this section, we provide a welfare analysis of the GRW policy by assessing its efficiency and
redistributive implications.
6.1 Efficiency Assessment
To asses the efficiency of the GRW, we calculate the marginal value of public funds (Hendren and
Sprung-Keyser, 2020). The measure relates marginal benefits of the policy to its marginal costs by
taking the ratio of the willingness to pay (WTP) of all beneficiaries of an incremental change in a
government policy to the net costs of the policy change:
MVPF =
Willingness to pay
Net government costs
(8)
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The willingness to pay aggregates the real economic effects of the policy, including the WTP of direct
beneficiaries (workers in directly treated plant) as well as additional beneficiaries due to spillovers.
Net government costs comprise both the direct program spending and the fiscal externalities caused
by the policy, for instance changes in income tax revenues triggered by changes in wages and/or
employment.
Since this approach does not rely on assumptions about welfare weights, knowing the MVPF
alone is in most cases not informative about the question of whether or not the policy should be
implemented.18 Instead, the MVPF unfolds its potential when comparing across policies that target
similar groups of recipients. In this case, the MVPF is informative of which policy can achieve the
same goal at a lower cost (Finkelstein and Hendren, 2020). Hence, we compare the MVPF of the
GRW with MVPFs for other policies that target a similar group of recipients such as welfare cash
transfer or unemployment benefits. Moreover, we can make an internal comparison comparing the
the GRW MVPFs with and without accounting for spillover effects.
We consider the policy experiment of increasing the subsidy rate by one percentage point and use
our reduced form estimates to calculate the resulting effects. We consider this experiment for two
reasons. First, we have a direct mapping between our reduced-form estimates and the MVPF formula.
Second, calculating the willingness to pay for marginal policy changes is more straightforward than
for large reforms (Finkelstein and Hendren, 2020, Kleven, 2021).
For the willingness to pay, we consider the following effects: (i) the increase in net earnings
due to newly created manufacturing jobs, (ii) the increase in net earnings due to positive spillover
effects to the retail and construction sector, (iii) the increase in net earnings due to newly created
manufacturing jobs via trade spillover, and (iv) the decrease in unemployment benefits payments for
newly hired workers.19
Since we do not find evidence for regional spillover, we use our plant-level estimates to calculate
the number of jobs created. We multiply the baseline estimates of a 1% increase with the average
number of manufacturing jobs in East Germany in our sample period to get the number of man-
ufacturing jobs created. We then multiply that number with the average manufacturing wage in
East Germany obtained from the SIAB in our sample period to get the increase in gross earnings.
We iterate this procedure for all estimates from year 0 after the reform to year 10 after the reform
assuming a discount rate of 3%.20 We subtract additional income taxes by applying the average
income tax rate to obtain net labor earnings. We conduct this procedure for manufacturing, retail and
construction jobs. Next, for the trade spillover, we adjust the coefficients for import exposure by the
average import exposure in our sample and compute the number of additional jobs by multiplying
the adjusted coefficient with the average number of manufacturing jobs in Germany as a whole. The
number of jobs is then multiplied with average manufacturing wage in Germany and income taxes
are subtracted. Last, we calculate the number of unemployed using our unemployment estimate and
multiply it by the average unemployment benefits in our sample period. This yields an estimate of
the unemployment benefits that individuals forgo by being employed.
18 If net government costs are negative, the policy pays for itself and the policy should always be implemented as long
as it the WTP is greater than zero.
19 The effect on manufacturing wages is very small and noisy. It does not affect the MVPF estimate but inflates standard
errors (see Appendix Figure C.9a). Therefore, we do not include it in our baseline.
20 Our estimates are virtually unchanged when we vary the discount rate (see Appendix Figure C.9b).
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Figure 6: Marginal value of public funds
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For net government costs, we consider the following items: (i) direct program spending, i.e. the
costs of the GRW subsidies, (ii) an increase in income taxes paid due to the increase in net earnings,
(iii) a decrease in unemployment benefits paid due to the decrease in unemployment, which also
reduces the net costs, and (iv) the changes in local business and property tax revenues.
For direct program costs, we make use of our estimate on the subsidies paid out in response to a
one-percentage-point change in the subsidy rate multiplied by the average subsidies paid out. We
then subtract the increase in income taxes of manufacturing, construction and retail workers as well
as the reduced spending on unemployment benefits. We calculate 95% confidence intervals using the
bootstrapping algorithm suggested by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020).
We start by focusing on the direct policy effect, i.e. the policy-induced changes in manufacturing
jobs. The estimated behavioral responses yield an aggregate willingness to pay of e0.784 billion
and net government costs of e1.594 billion. As Figure 6 shows, the resulting marginal value of
public funds is 0.50 [0.17,1.14]. Next, we add spillover effects on other sectors, which increases the
willingness to pay to e1.214 billion and reduces the net government costs to e1.520 billion. Hence,
sectoral spillovers increase the marginal value of public funds to a value of 0.80 [0.37,1.83]. Next,
we add the effect of trade spillovers, which increases the willingness to pay to e1.141 billion and
reduces the net costs to e1.484 billion. This increases the marginal value of public funds to a value
of 0.96 [0.47,2.22]. This shows in turn that disregarding spillover effects of place-based policies can
lead to substantially biased welfare conclusions. Last, we add the effect on unemployment benefits
and local tax revenues. These additions hardly change the marginal value of public funds (see Figure
6). However, it decreases precision since the unemployment and local tax revenue effects are rather
noisy.21
After having demonstrated the importance of accounting for spillovers, we compare the MVPF
of the place-based policy to the MVPF of other policies targeting a similar group of recipients. The
average East German worker in the manufacturing sector is 40 years old. We select unemployment
insurance and cash transfers as they target individuals of similar ages (30-40 years old) (Hendren and
21As discussed in Section 2, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) covers some of the direct policy costs.
Adopting a purely national perspective and ignoring these direct costs would increase the total MVPF, including spillovers,
to 1.16.
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Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Place-based policies aim at saving and creating jobs and thereby stabilizing
incomes. Unemployment insurance and cash transfers (welfare benefits) come in when jobs have
been lost. We take the estimates for unemployment insurance and cash transfers from the original
contribution by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020). Unemployment insurance and cash transfers
have an average marginal value of public funds of 0.61 and 0.79, respectively, which are similar, but
smaller than the GRW – in particular when accounting for the GRW’s positive spillover effects. For
comparison, we also calculate the MVPF for the top marginal income tax rate cuts, finding values
between 1.1 (assuming a low elasticity of taxable income of 0.1) and 2.2 (assuming a higher ETI of
0.5 as in Doerrenberg et al. (2017)).22
Cost per Job. As an alternative to the MVPF, we compute the cost per job created, another standard
measure of the cost effectiveness of a policy. This metric has the drawback that it neglects other
effects, such as workers forgoing unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, the measure is easy to
interpret and allows a comparison with estimates from the previous literature. To calculate the cost
per job, we take the estimate of the number of jobs created in manufacturing and other sectors as
well as the direct government costs from our marginal value of public funds exercise and take the
quotient. Appendix Figure A.11 shows the results for three scenarios. The cost per job is relatively
high at e44,412 [e17,446,e114,028] if one neglects all spillover effects. Including sectoral spillover
effects substantially reduces the costs per job to e27,113 [e10,250,e50,490] since both the number of
jobs increase as well as the net government costs decrease. Accounting for trade spillover causes the
estimate to decrease even further to e24,194 [e9,680,e50,981].
6.2 Implications for Regional Inequality
In a last step, we investigate the effectiveness of the GRW to achieve its politically stated goal, i.e. to
reduce regional inequality. In a first step, we calculate the coefficient of variation of the county-level
labor income a measure of regional inequality as suggested in Ehrlich and Overman (2020). We
calculate the labor income per capita in county c and year t from the BHP and SIAB data as follows.
labor income per capitact =
1
Nct
∑
s∈S
jobscst · wagecst (9)
where Nct denotes population in county c and year t and s stands for sector from set S =
{manufacturing, retail, construction, other}. Moreover, jobscst and wagecst are the number of jobs
and the average wage in county c, sector s and year t, respectively. Figure 7 shows that regional
inequality has increased from the mid-1990s until recent years. At the same time, the generosity of
the GRW as measured by annual spending has been decreasing over time (see Figure 7).
We are going to investigate how much of the increase in regional inequality could potentially be
reversed by increasing the subsidy rate for low-income counties. Clearly, we cannot causally link the
decrease in the generosity of the GRW to changes in inequality, but we can approximate its potential
22 We apply the formula MVPF = 11− τ1−τ ∗α∗ETI
from Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020). The top marginal tax rate τ in
Germany is 0.42 and is paid in incomes above 57,000e and we set α = 1.5 for labor income following Hermle and Peichl
(2013).
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Figure 7: GRW Subsidies and regional inequality over time in Germany
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Source: SIAB, BHP, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs Notes: The coefficient of variation is computed with respect to the labor income
per capita as calculated in equation (9).
to mitigate the increase by extrapolating from our causal reduced-form evidence derived in Section 5
and using regional distributions of jobs and wages per sector in 2014. We simulate the GRW effect
on regional inequality under various counterfactuals. In our baseline counterfactual, we increase the
subsidy rate of the bottom 20% counties (15 in total) in the East German labor income distribution to
their 1996 level.23 This corresponds to a 21 percentage point increase of the subsidy rate for these
15 counties on average. We apply the same methodology as in the previous sections to calculate
the additional manufacturing, retail and construction jobs from year 0 to year 10. We also calculate
the number of jobs created through trade linkages in all East German counties by multiplying their
import exposure to the treatment counties with our trade spillover estimate. In order to calculate the
counterfactual regional dispersion under this regime, we modify equation (9) to account for these
additional jobs in the treated counties. Comparing this counterfactual regional dispersion to the
actually observed regional inequality in 2014 indicates by how much an increase in the GRW could
curb regional inequality. We calculate 95% confidence intervals by bootstrapping the procedure. As
Figure 8 shows, expanding the GRW in this way reduces the coefficient of variation in 2014 by 0.0430
[0.0270,0.0508], or about 7%.
Next, we simulate the counterfactual of a revenue-neutral, place-blind policy and calculate its
impact on regional inequality. To that end, we uniformly increase welfare payments to every welfare
recipient, independent of location. First, we calculate the net cost of the GRW policy by dividing
the willingness to pay for the policy by the marginal value of public funds that we calculated in
Section 6.1, yielding total costs of e0.681 billion. Taking into account that increased payments to the
unemployed could have indirect costs on the government budget, for example by reducing labor
supply, we need to adjust the amount spend. In our baseline, we are conservative and assume that
the efficiency cost of the transfers are equal to the place-based policy even though the MVPF of
cash transfers provided by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) is somewhat lower.24 This yields
23 We also repeat the same exercise for the bottom 15% and 25% of the labor income distribution (see Appendix Figures
C.10a and C.10b). The resulting patterns are very similar to our baseline scenario.
24 In Appendix Figure C.11a, we apply the MVPF of 0.79 that Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) find, which further
strengthens our results.
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Figure 8: Counterfactual regional inequality
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Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the bottom
20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. The second bar displays the effect a revenue-neutral
policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within East Germany. The third and forth bar show the effects of the two policies if
they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws. The
p-values refer to one-sided tests whether the effect of the GRW policy is larger than the effect of cash transfers.
efficiency-adjusted costs of e0.668 billion.
Next, we divide the adjusted costs by the number of unemployed in East Germany and assign
each unemployed person this amount as a cash transfer. In this policy counterfactual, cash transfers
have a presented discounted value of e1,076. We simulate that in this counterfactual the coefficient
of variation decreases by 0.0194 [0.0110,0.0272], which is substantially lower than the effect of the
GRW policy (see Figure 8). This is due to the place-blind nature of the cash transfer policy which
captures spatial inequality only in so far that the number of unemployed is higher in poorer areas.
Since the counterfactual policy also increases the income of recipients in relatively rich regions, the
effect on regional inequality is much smaller compared to the place-specific policy.
So far both counterfactual have been targeted at East Germany. In a last step, we also simulate
how the two simulated policies would affect Germany as whole. As before, we increase the GRW
subsidy by the same amount for the bottom 20% of the overall German labor income distribution
in 2014. This corresponds to a 21 percentage points increase for 80 counties. The total cost of such
a policy would be e4.579 billion, which we again adjust by the marginal value of public funds of
our GRW policy to e4.487 billion. Dividing by the total number of unemployed in Germany in
2014 yields a presented discounted cash transfer of e1,548 per unemployed. As Figure 8 shows,
the pattern is very similar when we extend the two policy counterfactuals to all German counties.
The GRW policy would reduce spatial the coefficient of variation by 0.0442 [0.0219,0.0626], which
equals roughly two thirds of the increase in regional inequality we observe from 1996 to 2014. We
find a very similar pattern when we use the Gini coefficient as an alternative measure of inequality
(see Appendix Figure C.11b). We also investigate the role of spillover on the effect of the policy on
regional inequality. Appendix Figure A.12 shows that without accounting for any spillover effects the
effect on regional inequality is substantially lower. Adding sectoral spillover further reduces regional
inequality as it accounts for additional jobs created in poor regions. The effect of trade spillover
is ex ante ambiguous. On the one hand, if poorer regions generally have a higher trade exposure
to other poorer regions, it would further reduce regional inequality. On the other hand, if poorer
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regions are disproportionally connected to richer regions, trade spillovers dampen the reduction in
regional inequality. We find that for East Germany the first case applies, while for all of Germany the
latter applies. In general, the overall impact of trade spillover is rather modest in size. Last, we also
compare the effect of both policies on the gap in labor earnings between East and West Germany as
it was a stated goal of the GRW policy to equalize living conditions between the two. According to
the BHP and SIAB data in 2014, East Germans have a 33.29% lower labor income per capita than
West Germans. The GRW policy would reduce the gap by 4.97 [2.73,7.15] percentage points, whereas
the cash transfer reform policy would reduce the gap only by 2.99 [1.50,4.43] percentage points.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the direct, spillover and welfare effects of regional firm subsidies. Investi-
gating the case of investment subsidies predominantly paid to manufacturing firms in East Germany
after reunification, we exploit substantial variation in maximum subsidy rates for identification. First,
we find that the place-based policy has a strong local effect: a cut in the subsidy rate has a sizable and
robust negative effect on local manufacturing employment. A one-percentage-point decrease in the
maximum subsidy rate leads to a decrease in manufacturing employment of 1% ten years after the
reform. While wages remain unaffected, local unemployment increases. We provide evidence that
policy effects are symmetric, such that subsidy rate increases lead to higher levels of manufacturing
employment.
In a second step, we go beyond the effect on treated firms in treated counties and investigate
various spillover effects. We find evidence for local multiplier effects in the untreated construction and
retail sectors, in which employment also drops as a consequence of the reduction in the subsidy. Our
estimates suggest that one lost manufacturing job implies 0.64 jobs lost in the retail and construction
sectors. Counties with a high trade exposure to the treated counties also experience a slight decline
in manufacturing employment. In terms of regional spillovers, we do not find any evidence for
reallocation of labor within the local labor market. Last, we find that local policy makers increase
the business and property tax in response to subsidy cuts. We use the framework by Hendren and
Sprung-Keyser (2020) to show that the efficiency of the place-based policy is similar to unemployment
insurance of welfare cash transfers when ignoring these spillover effects. Accounting for spillovers
makes the regional subsidy slightly more cost-effective. Moreover, we show that the place-based
policy is favorable in reducing regional inequality compared to place-blind cash transfers.
In the light of the increase in regional inequality observed in many developed countries, place-
based firm subsidies could play a role to mitigate regions further drifting apart. In this respect, our
study adds to a recent set of papers demonstrating the positive welfare effects of place-based policies.
For instance, Austin et al. (2018) argues that place-based policies are more targeted. Fajgelbaum
and Gaubert (2020) demonstrate that place-based policies can increase spatial efficiency because
sorting off high-skilled workers is inefficient. Finally, Gaubert et al. (2021) show that place-based
redistribution is favorable compared to place-blind policies like income taxes when society favors
spatial equity. Our paper provides further evidence for this case. For Germany, a country where the
goal of spatial equity is referred to in the constitution, we show that targeted place-based policies
have important spillovers that go beyond traditional agglomeration forces.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: Ranking of counties based on the indicator (year 1997)
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Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: This figure plots indicator values and the ranks of counties in the year 1997. The
cutoff was formally at indicator value 100.
Figure A.2: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by skill
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment by
skill on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.4 for the point estimates.
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Figure A.3: Event study estimates: number of manufacturing establishments and county-level
manufacturing employment
-.0
2
-.0
15
-.0
1
-.0
05
0
.0
05
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log manufacturing employment log # manufacturing firms
Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in the log number of
manufacturing establishments and log manufacturing employment at the county level on leads and lags of a change in the maximum
assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the
county level. See Table C.5 for the point estimates.
Figure A.4: Event study estimates: total and non-manufacturing employment
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log industry employment on leads
and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30).
Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.6 for the point estimates.
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Figure A.5: Event study estimates: unemployed and labor force
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of
changes in the log unemployed and log labor force on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The
sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.7 for
the point estimates.
Figure A.6: Event study estimates: GDP per capita
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of
changes in log GDP per capita on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the
55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.8 for the point estimates.
35
Figure A.7: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (increases & decreases)
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment on
leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate. Treatment is discrete as in equation (1) and we include separate dummies for
increases and decreases in the subsidy rate. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is
at the county and plant level. See Table C.16 for the point estimates.
Figure A.8: Event study estimates: heterogeneous treatment effects
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of the methods developed in de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) and Sun and Abraham (2020) used on equation (1) with manufacturing employment as the outcome. We cut the
sample in 2006 for all three estimators to only have one treatment per unit and retain never-treated units. We implement the estimator
from de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020a) using the Stata command did multipleGT and obtain standard errors through 999
bootstrap iterations. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Standard errors are clustered at the county level. See
Table C.17 for the point estimates.
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Figure A.9: Event study estimates: housing prices
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Source: IVD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in the log housing price on
leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs
(M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Table C.23 for the point estimates.
Figure A.10: Event study estimates: population and commuting flows
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net commuting flow per employee log population
Source: Statistical Offices of German States, Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning Notes: This figure plots coefficients along
with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log population and the inverse hyperbolic sine of the net commuting flow per
employee on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Table C.25 for the point estimates.
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Figure A.11: Cost per job
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Source: own calculations Notes: Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
Figure A.12: Counterfactual regional inequality: the role of spillover
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Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the bottom
20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany without accounting for any spillover. The second and
third bar add trade and sectoral spillover, respectively. The forth, fifth and sixth bar show the effects of these scenarios if they were
applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
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B Online Appendix: Data and Institutions
B.1 Data
Table B.1: Definition of variables and data sources
year description source
plant level
total investment 1996 - 2016 Total investment normalized to 2010 e on the plant-level for
manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees.
AFiD
equipment investment 1996 - 2016 Equipment investment normalized to 2010 e on the plant-level
for manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees.
AFiD
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: low-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a lower secondary,
intermediate secondary or upper secondary school leaving cer-
tificate, but no vocational qualifications at the plant level.
BHP
employees: medium-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a lower secondary,
intermediate secondary or upper secondary school leaving cer-
tificate and a vocational qualification at the plant level.
BHP
employees: high-skill manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Number of manufacturing employees with a degree from a uni-
versity of applied sciences or a university at the plant level.
BHP
employees: retail 1996 - 2017 Total number of retail employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: construction 1996 - 2017 Total number of construction employees in at the plant level. BHP
employees: non-manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of non-manufacturing employees at the plant level. BHP
employees: all 1996 - 2017 Total number of employees at the plant level. BHP
county level
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the county level BHP
plants: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing plants at the county level. BHP
GRW subsidies 1996 - 2016 Total subsidies paid out normalized to 2010 e at the county level. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
subsidised investment 1996 - 2016 Total amount of investment that is subsidised by GRW funds
normalized to 2010 e at the county level.
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
median manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
mean manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Mean wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: low-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a lower
secondary, intermediate secondary or upper secondary school
leaving certificate, but no vocational qualifications at the county
level. We weight all observations with the duration of the em-
ployment spell within the year and drop all apprentices, social
service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: medium-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a lower
secondary, intermediate secondary or upper secondary school
leaving certificate and a vocational qualification. We weight all
observations with the duration of the employment spell within
the year and drop all apprentices, social service workers, working
students and interns.
SIAB
median manufacturing wage: high-skill 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of manufacturing workers with a degree
from a university of applied sciences or a university. We weight
all observations with the duration of the employment spell within
the year and drop all apprentices, social service workers, working
students and interns.
SIAB
median non-manufacturing wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of non-manufacturing workers at the
county level. We weight all observations with the duration of
the employment spell within the year and drop all apprentices,
social service workers, working students and interns.
SIAB
median wage 1996 - 2014 Median wage in 2010 e of workers at the county level. We weight
all observations with the duration of the employment spell within
the year and drop all apprentices, social service workers, working
students and interns.
SIAB
unemployed 1997 - 2014 Number of unemployed at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
population 1997 - 2017 Total population at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
labor force 1997 - 2017 Sum of unemployed and employed at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
GDP per capita 1997 - 2017 GDP per capita normalized to 2010 e at the county level. Statistical Offices of the German States
other investment subsidies 1997 - 2017 Sum of all other investment subsidies received by municipalities
aggregated to the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local business tax: multiplier 1997 - 2017 Average local business tax multiplier weighted with the 1995
population at the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: multiplier 1997 - 2017 Average local property tax multiplier weighted with the 1995
population at the county level.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local business tax: revenues 1997 - 2017 Local business tax revenues aggregated to the county level and
normalized to 2010 e.
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: revenues 1997 - 2017 Local property tax revenues aggregated to the county level and
normalized to 2010 e.
Statistical Offices of the German States
continued
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Table B.1 continued
year description source
local business tax: base 1997 - 2017 Local business tax base normalized to 2010 e and obtained by
dividing the local business tax revenues by the product of the
local business tax multiplier and the federal business tax rate
(Steuermesszahl).
Statistical Offices of the German States
local property tax: base 1997 - 2017 Local property tax base normalized to 2010 e and obtained by
dividing the local property tax revenues by the product of the
local property tax multiplier and the federal property tax rate
(Steuermesszahl).
Statistical Offices of the German States
net commuting flow per employee 1997 - 2017 Net number of commuters normalized with the number of em-
ployees at the county level.
Federal Office for Building and Regional
Planning
house price 1996 - 2012 House price index of the largest city within a county. We linearly
impute occasionally missing data points. For some county-year
pairs no data is available.
Immobilienverband Deutschland
trade flows 2010 Import and export flows between all German counties as well as
foreign countries measured in tons per year.
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital
Infrastructure
local labor market level
employees: manufacturing 1996 - 2017 Total number of manufacturing employees at the local labor
market-level.
BHP
Notes: This table provides details on the definition and sources for all variables used.
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics
variable mean sd N years
plant level
total investment (in thousand e) 931.16 7176.99 124754 1996 - 2016
equipment investment (in thousand e) 795.32 6618.93 124754 1996 - 2016
employees: manufacturing 21.82 87.53 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: low-skill manufacturing 1.52 8.59 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: medium-skill manufacturing 17.42 68.81 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: high-skill manufacturing 2.67 17.65 407694 1996 - 2017
employees: retail 7.82 21.87 897327 1996 - 2017
employees: construction 8.78 23.20 560518 1996 - 2017
employees: non-manufacturing 10.68 56.39 4055878 1996 - 2017
employees: all 11.70 60.00 4463572 1996 - 2017
county level
employees: manufacturing 5319.71 3850.82 1672 1996 - 2017
plants: manufacturing 243.84 159.58 1672 1996 - 2017
GRW subsidies (in million e) 18.39 27.54 1596 1996 - 2016
subsidised investment (in million e) 83.90 140.60 1596 1996 - 2016
median manufacturing wage 1894.95 299.55 1444 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: low-skill 1480.08 573.24 1424 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: medium-skill 1925.31 272.36 1444 1996 - 2014
median manufacturing wage: high-skill 3420.31 635.79 1444 1996 - 2014
median non-manufacturing wage 1647.77 163.58 1444 1996 - 2014
median wage 1700.38 145.27 1444 1996 - 2014
population 173891.30 96067.54 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: multiplier 357.06 45.30 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: multiplier 375.26 61.06 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: revenues (in million e) 10.80 9.03 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: revenues (in million e) 4.29 2.52 1672 1996 - 2017
local business tax: base (in million e) 72.90 63.50 1672 1996 - 2017
local property tax: base (in million e) 32.65 17.31 1672 1996 - 2017
net commuting flow per employee -0.13 0.21 1596 1997 - 2017
unemployed 13833.10 8588.68 1444 1996 - 2014
labor force 87131.02 52498.05 1672 1996 - 2017
GDP per capita 16901.04 2259.06 1672 1996 - 2017
other investment subsidies (in million e) 63.43 38.68 988 1996 - 2009
house price (in 1,000 e) 146.87 42.20 797 1996 - 2012
local labor market level
employees: manufacturing 7628.27 5457.74 1166 1996 - 2017
Notes: There are 76 counties in East Germany (excluding Berlin) according to 2014 county definitions. All monetary variables are
expressed in 2010 e. For sources and definitions see Table B.1.
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B.2 Institutions
Indicator formulas The following formulas describe the indicator used to evaluate the economic
performance of commuting zone r across regimes
indicator1997r = (in f r
1995
r )
0.1 × (wage1995r )
0.4 × (unemp1995r )
0.5
indicator2000r = (in f r
1999
r )
0.1 × (wage1997r )
0.4 × (unemp1996−1998r )
0.4 × (emp f orecastr)
0.1
indicator2007r = (in f r
2005
r )
0.05 × (wage2003r )
0.4 × (unemp2002−2005r )
0.5 × (emp f orecastr)
0.05
where in f rtr measures the quality of a region r’s infrastructure assessed at time t, wage represents
per-capita earnings, unemp the average unemployment rate, and emp f orecast is an employment rate
projection.
Construction of cutoff samples Tables B.3, B.4 and B.5 illustrate the indicator rankings and cutoffs
for the years 1997, 2000 and 2011. We do not use the rankings of the 2007 reform since all East
German counties were treated. When counties merge, we take the average of the individual counties’
indicators.
Table B.3: Counties around the cutoff (year 1997)
county indicator priority group
...
Mittelsachsen 99.725 high
Gotha 99.757 low
Zwickau 99.767 high
Magdeburg 99.801 high
Jerichower Land 99.801 high
Boerde 99.801 high
Ludwigslust-Parchim 99.868 low
Salzlandkreis 99.902 low
Rostock 99.904 high
Chemnitz 99.914 high
Spree-Neiße 99.926 high
KS Cottbus 99.926 high
Dahme-Spreewald 99.926 low
Halle (Saale) 100.003 low
Landkreis Leipzig 100.069 low
Nordsachsen 100.069 low
Schwerin 100.096 low
Weimarer Land 100.162 low
Weimar 100.162 low
Sömmerda 100.173 low
Erfurt 100.173 low
Meissen 100.326 low
Saale-Holzland-Kreis 100.442 low
Jena 100.442 low
Leipzig 100.476 low
Dresden 101.073 low
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
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Table B.4: Counties around the cutoff (year 2000)
county indicator priority group
...
Hildburghausen 99.724 high
Suhl 99.724 high
Eichsfeld 99.728 high
Gotha 99.742 low
Vogtlandkreis 99.752 high
Jerichower Land 99.765 high
Cottbus 99.774 high
Spree-Neiße 99.774 high
Dahme-Spreewald 99.774 low
Bautzen 99.813 low
Saale-Orla-Kreis 99.854 high
Teltow-Fläming 99.856 low
Zwickau 99.884 low
Rostock 99.902 high
Nordwestmecklenburg 99.951 high
Chemnitz 100.008 low
Ludwigslust-Parchim 100.034 low
Boerde 100.070 low
Magdeburg 100.070 low
Nordsachsen 100.083 low
Weimar 100.144 low
Weimarer Land 100.144 low
Wartburgkreis 100.151 low
Eisenach 100.151 low
Halle (Saale) 100.169 low
Saechsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge 100.177 low
Sonneberg 100.181 low
Erfurt 100.246 low
Sömmerda 100.246 low
Jena 100.256 low
Saale-Holzland-Kreis 100.256 low
Landkreis Leipzig 100.377 low
Schwerin 100.388 low
Meissen 100.444 low
Potsdam-Mittelmark 100.496 low
Leipzig 100.563 low
Dresden 101.117 low
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
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Table B.5: Counties around the cutoff (year 2011)
county NUTSII region priority group GDP per capita
...
Magdeburg, Stadt Magdeburg high 20,822e
Jerichower Land Magdeburg high 20,822e
Altmarkkreis Salzwedel Magdeburg high 20,822e
Boerde Magdeburg high 20,822e
Harz Magdeburg high 20,822e
Salzlandkreis Magdeburg high 20,822e
Stendal Magdeburg high 20,822e
Vogtlandkreis Chemnitz high 20,914e
Chemnitz, Stadt Chemnitz high 20,914e
Zwickau Chemnitz high 20,914e
Mittelsachsen Chemnitz high 20,914e
Erzgebirgskreis Chemnitz high 20,914e
Mansfeld-Suedharz Halle low 21,228e
Burgenlandkreis Halle low 21,228e
Halle (Saale), Stadt Halle low 21,228e
Saalekreis Halle low 21,228e
Elbe-Elster Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Cottbus Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Teltow-Flaeming Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Dahme-Spreewald Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Havelland Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Brandenburg an der Havel, Stadt Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Potsdam-Mittelmark Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Oberspreewald-Lausitz Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Spree-Neisse Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
Potsdam Brandenburg-Suedwest low 22,572e
...
Source: Statistical Offices of German States , Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
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Table B.6: Automatically eligible and non-eligible industries for GRW subsidies
Industries that are excluded from GRW subsidies
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Mining
Energy and water supply
Construction
Retail except for mail order
Transportation and warehousing
Hospitals
Industries that are automatically eligible for GRW subsidies
Manufacture of chemical products
Manufacture of plastic products
Manufacture of rubber products
Manufacture of ceramic products
Manufacture of concrete products
Manufacture of concrete products
Manufacture of cement products
Manufacture of glass products
Manufacture of signs
Manufacture of iron and steel products
Manufacture of non-ferrous metals
Casting of steel and iron
Casting of non-ferrous metals
Manufacture of machinery and technical devices
Manufacture of office machines and data processing equipment
Manufacture of vehicles
Manufacture of boats
Manufacture of electronics and electric technology
Manufacture of precision engineered, optical and surgical products
Manufacture of clocks
Manufacture of sheet metal products
Manufacture of toys, jewellery, musical instruments and sports equipment
Manufacture of timber products
Manufacture of forms, tools and models
Manufacture of pulp, groundwood, paper cardboard
Manufacture of print products
Manufacture of leather products
Manufacture of shoes
Manufacture of textiles
Manufacture of clothing
Manufacture of upholstery
Production of food for sale outside of the county
Production of animal feed
Mail order
Import and export wholesale
Data processing
Administration of industry firms or supra-regional service firms
Organizing congresses
Publishers
Research and experimental development for industry firms
Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities
Market research and public opinion polling
Business and management consultancy
Laboratory services for industry firms
Logistics
Tourism
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007) Notes: In-
dustries which are neither automatically eligible nor excluded from the subsidies have to show that the
conditions mentioned in Section 2 are met.
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C Online Appendix: Additional Results
Figure C.1: Event study estimates: total & equipment investment
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Source: AFiD Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log total and equipment
investment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (5). The sample includes the 55 counties closest
to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Table C.2 for the point estimates.
Figure C.2: Event study estimates: wages by skill
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Source: SIAB Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log median wages by
skill level on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to
cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Table C.10 for the point estimates.
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Figure C.3: Event study estimates: wages by sector and mean wages
(a) wages by sector
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(b) average & median wage
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Source: SIAB Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of changes in log manufacturing
wages by sector (Panel a) and log average wages (Panel b) on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county
level. The sample includes the 55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Tables C.11
and C.12 for the point estimates.
Figure C.4: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by cutoff sample and with controls
(a) manufacturing employment by cutoff sample
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(b) manufacturing employment with controls
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment on
leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate using different samples (Panel a) and including control variables (Panel b) as
in equation (5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Tables C.13 and C.14 for the point estimates.
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Figure C.5: Event study estimates: other subsidies received
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of
changes in log other subsidies on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the
55 counties closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Table C.15 for the point estimates.
Figure C.6: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment with binary treatment and without
partially treated
(a) with binary treatment
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(b) without partially treated counties
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment on
leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate with a binary treatment definition as in equation (1) (Panel a) and without the
partially treated counties (Panel b) as in equation (5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Tables C.18 and
C.19 for the point estimates.
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Figure C.7: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by number of lags and in first
differences
(a) by number of lags
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(b) fixed effect & first differences
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Source: BHP Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing employment on
leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate with different lag windows (Panel a) and in first differences (Panel b) as in
equation (5). Clustering of standard errors is at the county and plant level. See Tables C.20 and C.21 for the point estimates.
Figure C.8: Event study estimates: local tax revenues and tax bases
(a) local tax revenues per capita
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(b) local tax base per capita
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals of a regression of
changes in the log local business and property tax revenues (Panel a) and the log local business per capita and property tax base per
capita (Panel b) on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the county level. The sample includes the 55 counties
closest to cutoffs (M=30). Clustering of standard errors is at the county level. See Tables C.26 and C.27 for the point estimates.
Figure C.9: Marginal value of public funds including wage effects and by discount rate
(a) including wage effects
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Source: own calculations Notes: Confidence intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws.
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Figure C.10: Counterfactual regional inequality: bottom 15% and bottom 25%
(a) bottom 15%
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(b) bottom 25%
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Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the bottom
15% (Panel a) and bottom 25% (Panel b) of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. The second bar
displays the effect a revenue-neutral policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within East Germany. The third and forth bar show
the effects of the two policies if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence intervals are based
on 9,999 bootstrap draws. The p-values refer to one-sided tests whether the effect of the GRW policy is larger than the effect of cash
transfers.
Figure C.11: Counterfactual regional inequality: imposing different MVPFs and Gini coefficients
(a) imposing different MVPFs
H0(GRW  cash transfers):
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(b) Gini coefficient
H0(GRW  cash transfers):
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Source: BHP, SIAB Notes: The first bar displays the effect of an increase in the GRW subsidy back to 1996 levels for counties in the bottom
20% of the labor income distribution on regional inequality within East Germany. Panel (a) does not impose that the MVPF of the GRW
and cash transfer policy have to be the same and Panel (b) uses the Gini coefficient as an alternative measure of regional inequality. The
second bar displays the effect a revenue-neutral policy that pays cash transfers to all unemployed within East Germany. The third and
forth bar show the effects of the two policies if they were applied to Germany as a whole. East Germany excludes Berlin. Confidence
intervals are based on 9,999 bootstrap draws. The p-values refer to one-sided tests whether the effect of the GRW policy is larger than the
effect of cash transfers.
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Table C.1: Event study estimates: GRW subsidies
(1) (2)
log GRW subsidies log subsidized investment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.029 -0.028
(0.027) (0.032)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.003 -0.003
(0.024) (0.027)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.028 -0.037
(0.024) (0.026)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.089∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.114∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.028)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.105∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.131∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.095∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗
(0.032) (0.037)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.142∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.037)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.157∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.035)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.131∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.044)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.075∗ -0.056
(0.041) (0.044)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.120∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.039) (0.043)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.138∗∗ -0.146∗∗
(0.062) (0.071)
N 1,141 1,141
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 2 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Event study estimates: total and equipment investment
(1) (2)
log total investment log equipment investment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.007 0.009
(0.017) (0.017)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.015)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.006 0.004
(0.012) (0.012)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.017∗ -0.013
(0.010) (0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.021 -0.020
(0.013) (0.015)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.027 -0.025
(0.017) (0.018)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.043∗∗ -0.040∗
(0.020) (0.020)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.040∗ -0.038∗
(0.021) (0.021)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.039 -0.033
(0.026) (0.025)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.052∗ -0.046∗
(0.028) (0.027)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.047 -0.040
(0.031) (0.031)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.049 -0.037
(0.030) (0.030)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.011 -0.005
(0.033) (0.033)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.067 -0.049
(0.044) (0.040)
N 90,656 90,656
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.1 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Event study estimates: plant-level manufacturing employment
(1)
log manufacturing employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.002
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
N 312,503
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 3 for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by skill
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment:
low-skilled
log manufacturing
employment:
medium-skilled
log manufacturing
employment:
high-skilled
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.003 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.002 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.002 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.002 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.003 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.001 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N 114,771 299,229 123,354
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.2 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Event study estimates: number of manufacturing establishments and county-level manu-
facturing employment
(1) (2)
log manufacturing employment log manufacturing firms
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.008∗ 0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.009∗ -0.001
(0.005) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.010∗ 0.001
(0.006) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010 0.000
(0.006) (0.003)
N 1,210 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.3 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Event study estimates: total and non-manufacturing employment
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment
log
non-manufacturing
employment
log total
employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.002 -0.001 -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
N 312.503 2.939.470 3.252.514
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.4 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Event study estimates: unemployed and labor force
(1) (2)
log unemployed log labor force
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.002∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.003∗ -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
N 990 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figures A.5 for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Event study estimates: GDP per capita
(1)
log GDP per capita
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000
(0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.002
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.002
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.002
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.005
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.006
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.006
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.006
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.006
(0.005)
N 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.6 for detailed information. Statisti-
cal significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Event study estimates: manufacturing wages
(1)
log median manufacturing wage
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.000
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.000
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.001
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.001
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.001
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.000
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.001
(0.005)
N 1,045
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 4 for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.10: Event study estimates: manufacturing wages by skill
(1) (2) (3)
log median
low-skilled
manufacturing
wage
log median
medium-skilled
manufacturing
wage
log median
high-skilled
manufacturing
wage
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.008 0.000 0.003
(0.014) (0.002) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.015 -0.001 0.002
(0.013) (0.001) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.006 -0.001 -0.000
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.001) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.012 0.000 0.001
(0.016) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.030∗ -0.000 0.006∗∗
(0.016) (0.001) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.008 0.001 0.004
(0.017) (0.002) (0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.012 -0.001 -0.002
(0.018) (0.002) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.003 0.000 -0.002
(0.018) (0.002) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.022) (0.002) (0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007 0.000 -0.000
(0.023) (0.003) (0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.025) (0.003) (0.007)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(0.030) (0.004) (0.008)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.032) (0.004) (0.009)
N 1,024 1,045 1,045
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.2 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.11: Event study estimates: median wages by sector
(1) (2)
log median
non-manufacturing
wage
log median wage
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
N 1,045 1,045
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.3a for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.12: Event study estimates: mean manufacturing wages
(1)
log manufacturing wage
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.000
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.000
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.000
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.001
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.001
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.002
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.001
(0.004)
N 1,045
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.3b for detailed information. Statistical
significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.13: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by cutoff sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log manufacturing
employment: full
sample
log manufacturing
employment: M =
20
log manufacturing
employment: M =
30
log manufacturing
employment: M =
40
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.007∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 401,290 244,169 312,503 355,601
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.4a for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.14: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (including controls)
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment
log manufacturing
employment:
including controls
log manufacturing
employment:
including lagged
controls
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.002 -0.001∗ -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
N 312,504 312,504 312,504
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.4b for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.15: Event study estimates: other subsidies
(1)
log other subsidies
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.009
(0.007)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform 0.003
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.001
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.003
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.002
(0.007)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.004
(0.008)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.002
(0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.004
(0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.000
(0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.004
(0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.012
(0.013)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.012
(0.013)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.006
(0.012)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.000
(0.016)
N 770
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.5 for detailed information. Statisti-
cal significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.16: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (increases & decreases)
(1)
log manufacturing
employment
p-value: subsidy cut
= - subsidy increase
average subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.005
(0.010)
average subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.012
(0.011)
average subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000
(0.010)
average subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.011∗
(0.006)
average subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.014∗
(0.007)
average subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.026∗∗
(0.010)
average subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.032∗∗
(0.013)
average subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.042∗∗∗
(0.014)
average subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.041∗∗∗
(0.013)
average subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.047∗∗∗
(0.015)
average subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.070∗∗∗
(0.020)
average subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.066∗∗∗
(0.022)
average subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.080∗∗∗
(0.024)
average subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.095∗∗∗
(0.027)
average subsidy increase: year 4 before reform -0.010 0.211
(0.013)
average subsidy increase: year 3 before reform -0.003 0.362
(0.012)
average subsidy increase: year 2 before reform -0.001 0.372
(0.008)
average subsidy increase: year 0 after reform 0.023∗∗∗ 0.122
(0.008)
average subsidy increase: year 1 after reform 0.024∗∗ 0.335
(0.010)
average subsidy increase: year 2 after reform 0.043∗∗∗ 0.210
(0.013)
average subsidy increase: year 3 after reform 0.041∗∗∗ 0.546
(0.012)
average subsidy increase: year 4 after reform 0.042∗∗∗ 0.993
(0.014)
average subsidy increase: year 5 after reform 0.042∗∗∗ 0.964
(0.015)
average subsidy increase: year 6 after reform 0.043∗∗ 0.824
(0.018)
average subsidy increase: year 7 after reform 0.055∗∗∗ 0.498
(0.020)
average subsidy increase: year 8 after reform 0.060∗∗∗ 0.767
(0.019)
average subsidy increase: year 9 after reform 0.062∗∗∗ 0.384
(0.019)
average subsidy increase: year 10 after reform 0.059∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.021)
joint test of asymmetry for all post-reform effects 0.214
N 312,503
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.7 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.17: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Sun and Abraham (2020) & de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille (2020a)
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment:
baseline
log manufacturing
employment: Sun
and Abraham (2020)
log manufacturing
employment:
de Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfoeuille
(2020a)
average subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.015 0.021 0.008
(0.025) (0.033) (0.029)
average subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.013 0.007 -0.000
(0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
average subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.001 0.018 0.023
(0.012) (0.017) (0.020)
average subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
average subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.026∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
average subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.043∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.015
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
average subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.045∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.035∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
average subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.071∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.035
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
average subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.067∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.035
(0.026) (0.020) (0.023)
average subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.071∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.038∗
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023)
average subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.111∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.036) (0.031)
average subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.102∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032) (0.033)
average subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.114∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.031) (0.030)
N 161,876 161,876 161,876
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The sample is ended in 2006 for all columns. See Figure A.8 for detailed information. Statistical
significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.18: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment with binary treatment
(1)
log manufacturing
employment
average subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.006
(0.007)
average subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.009
(0.009)
average subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000
(0.007)
average subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.012∗∗
(0.006)
average subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.014∗
(0.007)
average subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)
average subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.031∗∗∗
(0.011)
average subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.036∗∗∗
(0.011)
average subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.036∗∗∗
(0.010)
average subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.038∗∗∗
(0.013)
average subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.051∗∗∗
(0.015)
average subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.051∗∗∗
(0.016)
average subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.057∗∗∗
(0.016)
average subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.067∗∗∗
(0.022)
N 312,503
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.6a for detailed information. Statistical
significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.19: Event study estimates: plant-level manufacturing employment (without partially treated
counties)
(1)
log manufacturing employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
N 180,020
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.6b for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
69
Table C.20: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by lags
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment
log manufacturing
employment
log manufacturing
employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 11 after reform -0.010∗∗∗
(0.004)
N 312,503 312,503 312,503
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.7a for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.21: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (first difference)
(1)
log manufacturing employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.002
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform 0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.001∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.001
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
N 293,534
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure C.7b for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.22: Event study estimates: employment by finer industries
(1) (2) (3)
log manufacturing
employment
log retail
employment
log construction
employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 -0.001 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.002 -0.001 -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.004∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
N 312,503 652,099 409,551
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 5a for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.23: Event study estimates: housing prices
(2)
log house price
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform 0.001
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.003
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.002
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.002
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.000
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.001
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.004
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.003
(0.008)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.004
(0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.003
(0.012)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.002
(0.016)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.008
(0.017)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.005
(0.017)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.005
(0.021)
N 550
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.9 for detailed information.
Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.24: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment at the labor market level
(1)
log manufacturing employment
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.000
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.000
(0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.001
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.003
(0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.003
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.003
(0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.002
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.004
(0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.008∗
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.010∗
(0.005)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.011∗
(0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.010∗
(0.006)
N 726
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 5b for detailed information. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.25: Event study estimates: net commuting flow per employee and population
(1) (2)
net commuting flow per employee log population
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.002 0.000
(0.008) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.000)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.003 0.000
(0.005) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.005 0.001
(0.010) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.002 0.002
(0.022) (0.001)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.001 0.002
(0.023) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.000 0.002
(0.025) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.007 0.002
(0.028) (0.002)
N 1,045 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure A.10 for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.26: Event study estimates: local business tax rate, tax revenues and tax base
(1) (2) (3)
log business tax rate log business tax revenues per capita log business tax base
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.001∗ -0.004 -0.003
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000 0.005 0.006
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.000 -0.007∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.000 0.005 0.005
(0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.000 0.007 0.008
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.003∗ -0.006 -0.009
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.003∗∗ -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.004∗∗ -0.006 -0.010
(0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.004∗∗ -0.008 -0.012
(0.002) (0.010) (0.011)
N 1,210 1,210 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figures 5c, C.8a and C.8b for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.27: Event study estimates: local property tax rate, tax revenues and tax base
(1) (2) (3)
log property tax rate log property tax revenues per capita log property tax base
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform 0.001 0.005∗ 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform 0.003∗ 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform 0.004∗ 0.005 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform 0.003∗ 0.006 0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform 0.004∗ 0.006 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
N 1,210 1,210 1,210
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figures 5c, C.8a and C.8b for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.28: Event study estimates: trade spillover
(1)
log manufacturing employment
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 before reform -0.000006
(0.000007)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 before reform -0.000007
(0.000005)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 before reform -0.000005
(0.000004)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 0 after reform -0.000006
(0.000003)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 1 after reform -0.000006
(0.000005)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 2 after reform -0.000013∗∗
(0.000006)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 3 after reform -0.000011
(0.000007)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 4 after reform -0.000017∗
(0.000009)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 5 after reform -0.000015
(0.000011)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 6 after reform -0.000018
(0.000013)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 7 after reform -0.000020
(0.000012)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 8 after reform -0.000018
(0.000013)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 9 after reform -0.000025∗
(0.000013)
1% trade exposure to 1 pp subsidy cut: year 10 after reform -0.000047∗
(0.000024)
N 2,555,361
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Figure 5d for detailed information. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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